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NOTES
EVIDENCE-APPLICATION OF PAROL EVIDENCE RULE TO WRITTEN MEMORANDUM OF AN ORAL CONTRACT WITHIN THE STATUTE

OF FRAuDs.-[New York] A case' recently decided by the New
York Court of Appeals presents several perplexing problems.

The plaintiff and the defendant negotiated a contract by telephone for the sale of certain bank stock to the defendant. The
plaintiff then signed and sent to the defendant a written "confirmation" of the sale which was accepted by the latter. In this document
the purchase price was stated as $1,060.00 a share. The plaintiff
claimed that in the oral contract a price of $1,160.00 had been
agreed on, and that the price of $1,060.00 was entered in the confirmation by mistake. The defendant claimed that $1,060.00 was
the price agreed on.
The defendant brought an action for damages for the failure
to deliver the stock at the lower price. The plaintiff brought a
cross-action for reformation of the confirmation and damages for
failure to accept and pay the higher price. The actions were consolidated and tried together, resulting in a judgment in favor of
the defendant. The Appellate Division reversed this judgment
and entered a decree in favor of the plaintiff for reformation and
damages. The Court of Appeals reversed this decree and dismissed
both actions on the following theories:
First, that "parol evidence" was admissible to prove that the
written confirmation or memorandum did not conform to the oral
contract.
Second, that the Statute of Frauds required a memorandum
conforming to the contract actually made, and that the finding of
mistake demonstrated that there was no note or memorandum in
writing of the true oral contract.
Third, that a court of equity could not, by the process of reformation, supply a memorandum which the parties had not made.
In other words, the defendant could not enforce the contract
he alleged because no such contract was made.
The plaintiff could not enforce the real contract because there
was no corresponding written memorandum.
The plaintiff could not have relief in equity because the oral
contract was unenforceable in the absence of a written memorandum
conforming to it.
This note is not concerned with the question of relief in equity
since that involves a field with which the writer is not particularly
familiar, though it is rather hard to see why a court of equity is
precluded from decreeing the reformation of a memorandum if it
could decree reformation of a contract required to be in writing.
It is perfectly obvious that without reformation of the memo1. Donald Friedvnan & Co. v. Nezunan (N. Y. 1931) 174 N. E. 703.
[320]
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randum the vendor could not enforce an oral contract for a sale at
$1,160.00 a share because there was no written memorandum of
such a contract. The doubtful question is whether the vendee's
action at law should be defeated by proof of the variance between
the oral contract and the written memorandum on which he relied.
The opinion disposes of the matter by this statement:
"The memorandum is not subject to the parol evidence rule, for it
does not integrate, but merely evidences, the oral agreement. It may
be shown by parol to be inaccurate or incomplete."
The statement that the memorandum may be shown to be inaccurate or incomplete seems to be supported by the cases, though
the actual decisions on the point are rather scant.2 If the confirmation was a mere evidence document, a mere written admission like
a receipt, it could of course be contradicted. 3 The so-called "parol
evidence" rule is not a rule discriminating between writings as
evidence and other varieties of evidence, but operates to shut out the
facts, which the evidence tends to prove, as the basis of a claim or
defense.
In the case of written contracts, or oral contracts "integrated"
by a written instrument, the parties have theoretically expressed
their intention to be bound exclusively by the writing, and, so far
as the courts give effect to such expressed intent, they shut out
prior oral agreements because they are no longer effective.
Now it may be granted that the written confirmation was not
a contract or the integration of a contract, and hence is not governed
by the technical contract rule. From this it does not follow that it
is open to contradiction to the same extent as a receipt or a mere
memorandum.
Where the Statute of Frauds is involved, a written memorandum, conforming to certain standards of completeness, etc., has the
legal effect of making the contract enforceable. That is, a sufficient
memorandum either furnishes the necessary condition precedent to
the maintenance of an action, or operates to destroy an excuse for
non-performance of the oral contract.
If insufficient on its face, the deficiency can not be supplied by
proof of the oral contract for the simple reason that under the
accepted construction of the statute, nothing short of a writing
embodying the omitted price, quantity, description, etc., will have
the desired legal effect. If the memorandum is sufficient on its face
to make enforceable the contract alleged, and which it tends to
prove, then whether such memorandum may be invalidated by a
variance between it and the oral contract depends on the effect given
to the statutory requirement of a written memorandum.
If the statute is construed as requiring actual conformity in
fact between the memorandum and the oral contract, then, of course,
2. Boardman v. Spooner (1866) 13 Allen (Mass.) 353; Fisher v.
Andrews (1901) 94 Md. 46; Williams v. Pittsfield Lime Co. (1926) 258 Mass.

65.
3. En4dgn v. Webster (1799) 1 Johnson's Cases (N. Y.) 145.

26 ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW

lack of conformity would be provable because by this assumption it
would destroy the legal effect of the memorandum. Whether sound
policy requires such a construction of the statute is a matter which
deserves more consideration than has apparently been given to it.
It might be thought that the purpose of the statute was to prevent fraud and perjury by eliminating contentions which could be
supported by perjured testimony. If a memorandum, sufficient on
its face, is subject to attack for alleged mistake or omission,
there is as much opportunity for fraud and manufactured testimony
as there would be where no statute had been passed, because the
same contest would arise in the attempt to prove and disprove the
terms of the oral contract.
There is no greater hardship in shutting out mistake as a
ground of defense to a written memorandum deliberately made for
the purpose of making the sale binding than there is shutting out
mistake in integration as a defense to a written integration of an
oral contract.
Different consideration might affect a casual memorandum or
written admission not made for the purpose of complying with the
statute.
If there is undue hardship in making the memorandum conclusive in actions triable by jury, a court of equity could order the
cancellation of the memorandum on satisfactory proof of such a
mistake as to make it unconscionable to hold the party to the writing.
If this view should be accepted mistake would doubtless be
treated as an "equitable defense" in the code states, though in New
York that would not be helpful since the New York Practice Act
has been construed to make equitable defenses triable by jury.4
E. W. HINTON.
PRACTICE-EFFECT OF LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENTS OF RULES OF
PRACTICE AS AN INVASION OF THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT-[United

States] Herron v. Southern Pac. Co." recalls the case in Illinois2
which involved the construction and validity of that provision of
the Illinois Practice Act (Section 66) making it a cause of continuance, if it shall appear to the court that the attorney, solicitor,
or counsel of the party applying for the continuance is a member
of the General Assembly of the State, in actual attendance of its
sessions at the time, and that the attendance of the attorney, solicitor, or counsel in court is necessary to a fair and proper trial
of the suit. In that case the court found the affidavit relied upon
for a continuance insufficient to show that attendance in court by
the particular attorney who was the member of the General Assembly was necessary. In sustaining the action of the trial court
in its refusal to permit a continuance in that case, the court held
that to give to the statute the effect of requiring a continuance on
4. Susquehannta S. S. Co. v. Anderson (1925)

239 N. Y. 285.

1. (1931) 75 L. Ed. Adv. Sheets 586, 51 Sup. Ct. 383.
2. Johnson v. Theodoron (1927) 324 Il. 543, 547.

